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CISA telecom report reveals SS7 and Diameter risks exposed before Salt Typhoon

A newly public CISA-commissioned report warned in 2022 that structural weaknesses in U.S. telecom signaling could enable location tracking, message interception, call eavesdropping and service disruption. The report predates Salt Typhoon, but does not establish that the same weaknesses caused that campaign.

By Nathaniel PettusCybersecurity, Linux/UNIX, OSINT, and privacy-focused analysis

What happened?

Confirmed facts: On November 19, 2026, the Electronic Privacy Information Center released a redacted copy of a 2022 telecommunications security report commissioned by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. EPIC obtained it after a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit. The report was prepared by AdaptiveMobile Security and Telecom Defense Limited, and Reuters says it independently reviewed the document. It describes major structural weaknesses in U.S. telecom interconnection and examines SS7, Diameter and related signaling protocols, including examples of potential threat activity directed at a U.S. operator. The report itself is marked preliminary and says it does not represent a coordinated Department of Homeland Security position. What remains unresolved: many technical and policy recommendations are redacted, CISA did not immediately respond to Reuters, and publication of the report does not identify a new breach or prove that every carrier is compromised. Senator Ron Wyden argues that releasing the report in 2022 could have enabled standards that prevented the later Salt Typhoon campaign. That is Wyden's assessment, not a demonstrated causal finding in the report. The document predates Salt Typhoon and establishes that serious risks were known, but it does not prove these specific signaling weaknesses were the entry path used in that campaign.

How the technology works

Safe defensive explanation: SS7 is a signaling system created decades ago to help telephone networks route calls, messages and roaming connections. It was designed around trust between participating networks, not today's threat environment. Diameter performs related signaling functions in newer mobile networks, but modern systems remain connected to legacy infrastructure for roaming and interoperability. An attacker who gains trusted signaling access—directly or through a compromised carrier, interconnection provider or other telecom partner—may be able to send network requests that reveal a device's approximate location, redirect or block messages, eavesdrop on calls, hijack a phone's service profile or cause disruption. The risk comes from the shared telecom infrastructure, so installing an ordinary phone update cannot repair the underlying protocol. This article omits signaling commands, routing details and operational instructions that could enable abuse.

Who is affected?

Who is affected: every mobile subscriber depends on carriers and their interconnection partners to protect signaling data, but risk is higher for government officials, military personnel, journalists, activists, executives and others likely to be targeted for surveillance. EPIC says SS7 remains relevant to 2G and 3G service and international roaming, while interconnection with Diameter and newer networks allows legacy weaknesses to persist. The report also describes smaller and rural telecom operators as potential weak points because attackers can target less-resourced organizations and then abuse trusted connectivity. This does not mean every call or text is being intercepted, that all carriers have the same exposure, or that a person can determine compromise from poor reception or a delayed message alone.

What should you do?

What should you do? Individuals: use end-to-end encrypted messaging and calling for sensitive conversations when both parties can do so; prefer passkeys, security keys or authenticator apps over SMS for multifactor authentication; enable a carrier account PIN or port-out lock; treat unexpected calls and texts as untrusted even when the displayed number looks familiar; and keep phones and carrier applications updated. People at elevated risk should ask their organization for a threat-specific communications plan instead of relying on ordinary SMS for sensitive work. Organizations: remove SMS as the sole recovery or authentication channel, protect executive and administrator phone accounts, and include carrier-account takeover and signaling abuse in incident-response exercises. Carriers and regulators: strengthen SS7 and Diameter filtering, monitor abnormal signaling, restrict and audit interconnection access, segment management systems, verify third-party providers, support smaller carriers, and establish enforceable minimum cybersecurity requirements. These steps reduce risk but cannot guarantee that a carrier-level attack is detectable from the handset.

OPINION

My analysis

My Analysis: The privacy failure here is larger than one old protocol. Mobile networks routinely process location, identity and communications metadata that can reveal where people sleep, worship, seek medical care and meet others. When the government knows that infrastructure has structural weaknesses, keeping the findings secret for years can prevent customers, lawmakers and smaller carriers from demanding meaningful fixes. Security does require protecting details that would directly enable exploitation, but secrecy should be narrow: publish the existence and scale of the risk, remediation priorities, deadlines and accountability while redacting only the operational material that would create immediate danger. The right response is enforceable security standards, independent audits, assistance for under-resourced carriers and transparent reporting—not asking individuals to surrender more personal data or accept permanent surveillance in the name of protection.

Why this matters

Cyber incidents often sound distant or overly technical. The important question is whether the same weakness, behavior, surveillance power, or exposure exists in systems you use. Facts and opinion are separated here so you can judge both clearly.